

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI

SCHWARZ PHARMA, INC., n/k/a UCB, INC.,)	
)	Case No. SC 93516
)	
Relator,)	Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern
)	District No. ED99877
v.)	
)	Circuit Court of St. Louis City
THE HONORABLE DAVID L. DOWD,)	Cause No. 1222-CC10178 (Bryan)
JUDGE, CIRCUIT COURT OF ST. LOUIS)	
CITY, MISSOURI)	
)	
Respondent.)	

**REPLY BRIEF OF RELATOR
SCHWARZ PHARMA, INC., n/k/a UCB, INC.**

HEPLERBROOM LLC
Gerard T. Noce, #27636
gtn@heplerbroom.com
Larry E. Hepler, #21753
leh@heplerbroom.com
Beth A. Bauer, #49981
bab@heplerbroom.com
211 N. Broadway, Suite 2700
St. Louis, MO 63102
314/241-6160/Fax: 314/241-6116

MAYER BROWN LLP
Henninger S. Bullock
hbullock@mayerbrown.com
Andrew J. Calica
acalica@mayerbrown.com
1675 Broadway
New York, NY 10019
Tel: 212/506-2500
Fax: 212/262-1910

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

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Statement of Facts

Relator Schwarz Pharma, Inc. n/k/a UCB, Inc. (“Schwarz”) stands on the Statement of Facts in Relator’s Brief in Support of a Permanent Order Prohibiting Respondent from Enforcing his Order Denying Relator’s Motion to Transfer, which was filed on October 15, 2013. The key facts in this matter are:

- Relator was first served with any petition related to Ms. Bryan’s claims on October 2, 2012, when Relator was served with the previously severed—and therefore inoperative—Second Amended *Anderson* Petition. **A189-A191.**
- On October 3, 2012, Plaintiff Bryan filed her Individual Petition in accordance with the severance order. Relator was served with Plaintiff Bryan’s Individual Petition on October 4, 2012. **A192-A230.**
- On November 15, 2012, Relator filed a Motion to Transfer for Improper Venue under RSMo. §§ 508.010 and 347.069(a), and Missouri Rule of Civil Procedure 51.045. **A231-A236.**
- On January 25, 2013, Respondent Judge David L. Dowd heard oral argument on the Motion to Transfer for Improper Venue. **A449.** Relator argued that the November 15, 2012 Motion to Transfer was timely because Relator, who was not a party to the *Anderson* case until October 2, 2012 at the earliest, had until December 3, 2013, to move to transfer.
- On April 3, 2013 Relator submitted a Motion to Enforce Transfer Pursuant to RSMo. 508.010.10. **A450.** That same day, at the hearing on the Motion to Enforce Transfer, Relator again reminded Respondent that the November 15, 2012

Motion to Transfer was timely because Relator had until December 3, 2013, to move to transfer.

- On April 5, 2013, Respondent denied the Motion to Transfer and the Motion to Enforce Transfer on the lone ground that Relator's Motion to Transfer was untimely. **A1-A5.**

ARGUMENT

I. RELATOR TIMELY RAISED, AND INCORPORATED INTO THE RECORD, THE ARGUMENT THAT IT HAD SIXTY DAYS FROM SERVICE OF ANY PETITION UPON IT TO MOVE FOR TRANSFER.

It is undisputed that Relator filed its Motion to Transfer less than 60 days after it was first served with any petition related to Plaintiff Bryan's claims. Accordingly, Relator's Motion to Transfer was timely filed. Illogically, Respondent argues that, while the motion was timely filed, Relator waived the argument that the motion was timely because Relator did not "properly raise" the argument or make it "part of the record before Respondent." This argument is both legally and factually incorrect.

A motion to transfer is either timely or untimely. Rule 51.045 provides: "If a timely motion to transfer venue is filed, the venue issue is not waived by any other action in the case." Rule 51.045(a)(2); *see also State ex rel. Vee-Jay Contracting Co. v. Neill*, 89 S.W.3d 470, 472 (Mo. 2002) (holding that upon the timely filing of a motion establishing that an action is filed in an improper venue, it is the obligation of the court to transfer the case to the proper venue). A timely filed motion cannot be "waived" simply because the moving party did not argue in its papers the self-evident (and undisputed) fact that the motion was timely.

Respondent ignores the plain language of Rule 51.045 that filing preserves a venue challenge, and instead asserts that Relator waived the argument that it timely moved to transfer because Defendants did not raise the issue in the pleadings. That argument is unsupported by any rule or case law, including those cited by Respondent.

The majority of the cases cited by Respondent hold that *when an issue is not raised at the trial court level*, it may be deemed waived. See *Howard v. City of Kansas City*, 332 S.W.3d 772, 791 (Mo. 2011) (declining to consider an issue on appeal because defendant never raised that issue at the trial court level and holding “[b]ecause the City did not argue against the submissibility of future damages in its motion for directed verdict, it has failed to preserve the issue for appeal”); *Norden v. Friedman*, 756 S.W.2d 158, 162 (Mo. 1988) (holding that a statute of frauds defense is waived when not raised in the pleadings or at trial); *Frein v. Madesco Inv. Corp.*, 735 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that defendant waived its theory of the admissibility of evidence because it did not raise that theory at the hearing or at trial); *Stenger v. Great Southern Sav. & Loan Assoc.*, 677 S.W.2d 376, 382 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that where plaintiffs’ reply made a general assertion that a statute was “vague, overbroad and indefinite” and at trial plaintiffs’ counsel stated that the statute was unconstitutional on the grounds “set forth in my reply,” plaintiff failed to preserve an invalidity argument for appeal); *Jones v. Church*, 252 S.W.2d 647, 648 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952) (defendants “did not make any complaint of improper venue in the court below”). None of these cases support Respondent’s argument because Respondent’s argument is nonsensical. The timeliness of Relator’s motion did not need to be stated in the pleadings because timeliness was: (1) preserved by filing the motion to transfer; and (2) clear from the record. Respondent had before him as part of the record the Return of Service on Relator (October 2, 2012) and Relator’s Motion to Transfer (November 15, 2012).

Moreover, unlike the cases cited by Respondent, here Relator's timeliness was indeed raised at the trial court level—during the Motion to Transfer and Motion to Enforce Transfer hearings. Respondent cites to several cases in an attempt to suggest that Relator's timeliness argument was waived because there is no transcript of the Motion to Transfer and Motion to Enforce Transfer hearings. Indeed, neither Respondent nor Plaintiff has ever disputed the fact that Relator raised the timeliness of its motion during the hearings on Relator's Motion to Transfer and Motion to Enforce Transfer. Nevertheless, Respondent's cases simply establish that, where there is a **disagreement** about events, a court will not look beyond a recorded transcript in order to alter that transcript. *See Hendershot v. Minich*, 297 S.W.2d 403, 408-10 (Mo. 1956) (when presented with an incomplete transcript and conflicting affidavits of counsel, refusing to resolve the issue whether a party had consented to sentencing outside the county); *Chilton v. Gorden*, 952 S.W.2d 773, 777 (Mo. Ct. App. S.D. 1997) ("Except where conceded as true by the opposing party, statements asserted in the party's brief that are not supported by the record on appeal supply no basis for appellate review."); *Sams v. Green*, 591 S.W.2d 15, 18 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) ("The appellate court will not consider post-trial recollections of what transpired at trial to complete, correct, or impeach the recorded transcript."). Here, the absence of transcripts of these hearings is a non-issue because there is **no disagreement** that the timeliness issue was raised.

Relator preserved its venue challenge by timely filing a motion to transfer and as Rule 51.045 makes clear no subsequent action can (or did) waive that challenge. The timeliness of Relator's Motion to Transfer was clear from the record before Respondent

and was raised on multiple occasions at the trial court level. Respondent has failed, time and time again, to identify any statute, rule or case that supports his claim that the timeliness issue was waived. Indeed, this Court has granted permanent writs based on arguments that were not raised in the writ briefs. *See, e.g., State ex rel. Carver v. Whipple*, 608 S.W.2d 410, 412 (Mo. banc Dec. 15, 1980) (making a preliminary writ permanent “for reasons not raised in the [writ] briefs but urged for the first time during oral argument”). Respondent erred by ruling that Relator’s Motion to Transfer Venue was not timely filed. Thus, a permanent writ of prohibition is the appropriate remedy.

II. RELATOR TIMELY RAISED, AND INCORPORATED INTO THE RECORD, THE ARGUMENT THAT IT HAD SIXTY DAYS FROM SERVICE OF THE BRYAN INDIVIDUAL PETITION TO MOVE FOR TRANSFER.

In his Brief, Respondent states that “Relator’s argument with respect to the service of the [I]ndividual Petition upon it is that it should be treated differently than its co-defendants because it was served *after* the August 8, 2012 Severance Order.” **Resp. Brief, pg. 10.** Respondent is correct. But to be clear, Relator’s argument is not that there is some significance in the fact that it was first served after severance. The point is that Relator was first served with any petition related to Ms. Bryan’s claims on October 2, 2013, and first served with Ms. Bryan’s Individual Petition on October 4. Using either service date, Relator’s November 15, 2013 Motion to Transfer was timely.

Basic principles of due process and Missouri Rules of Civil Procedure require that Relator be treated differently from any other Defendant because each party stands on its

own. Respondent ignores this obvious point and, without citation to any rule or case, argues that Relator waived the right to argue that its motion was timely when it “hitch[ed] its wagon to the efforts and arguments of” its co-Defendants. **Id.** Respondent’s argument is almost too confusing to address. As more fully stated in Point I, it is clear from the record that, after being served with process in this matter for the first time, Relator timely moved for transfer. *See* Rule 51.045. Contrary to Respondent’s apparent position, a party cannot take any action, much less waive a right, before it has been served with process and properly before the court. Moreover, a party does not abandon its own arguments merely by joining the arguments of another defendant.

Respondent also ignores the fact that Relator’s motion was timely for a second reason; namely, that the *Bryan* case did not exist until October 3, 2012. Before that date, Relator was simply a named defendant in an inoperative multi-plaintiff *Anderson* petition. Until the Bryan Individual Petition was filed, there was no case name, no case number, and no physical file to transfer. Relator, and all other Defendants for that matter, could not have moved for transfer of the *Bryan* case until the Bryan Individual Petition was filed. Separate and apart from his error regarding the 60-day issue, Respondent erred by ignoring this fact and ruling that Relator’s Motion to Transfer Venue was not timely filed. Thus, a permanent writ of prohibition is the appropriate remedy.

III. RESPONDENT INCORRECTLY EXPLAINS THE STANDARD FOR GRANTING A WRIT OF PROHIBITION.

The Writ of Prohibition should be made permanent because the Respondent exceeded his jurisdiction and usurped the power of the St. Louis County Circuit Court

when he ruled that Relator's Motion to Transfer Venue was not timely filed. In his brief, Respondent suggests that this Court cannot grant a writ of prohibition because Relator has not established that it will suffer irreparable harm without a writ and because Relator has failed to adequately quantify that irreparable harm. This is an incorrect understanding of both the law and the facts of this case.

A writ of prohibition is available (1) to prevent a usurpation of judicial power, (2) to remedy an excess of jurisdiction, or (3) to prevent an absolute irreparable harm to a party. *See State ex rel. KCP & L Greater Mo. Operations Co. v. Cook*, 353 S.W.3d 14, 17 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 2011). Respondent acted outside of his jurisdiction when he held that Relator's Motion to Transfer was untimely and found that Relator should have moved to transfer the case over five months before Relator had been served with any petition in this matter. A permanent writ is appropriate on this fact alone. Relator also has shown that, in refusing to transfer this matter to St. Louis County—the only Missouri county in which venue properly lies—Respondent usurped the judicial power of the St. Louis County Circuit Court. Again, a permanent writ is appropriate on this fact alone.

Respondent's claim that this Court has already found the factual scenario of this case insufficient to warrant prohibition is also without merit. Respondent argues that because the Court declined to issue writs of prohibition pursuant to the petitions brought by other defendants, "the logical conclusion [is that] venue was proper in the City of St. Louis, or that even though it was not, prohibition was not warranted under the circumstances." **Resp. Brief, page 14.** Respondent's logic is faulty. First, despite his urging to the contrary, Respondent seems to suggest that by declining to issue these writs

this Court effectively issued a decision on the merits. Such a suggestion is wrong. Second, Respondent makes no effort to defend jurisdiction in the City of St. Louis on the merits and ignores the distinguishing fact that Relator's motion to transfer unquestionably was filed within 30 days after it was first served with any process in this matter. Finally, there is a far more plausible "logical conclusion" that can be drawn from this Court's decision not to issue preliminary writs to other defendants—The Court found it unnecessary to issue multiple writs, which would have the same effect, in this case.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the preliminary writ issued by the Court should be made permanent.

Respectfully Submitted,

HEPLERBROOM LLC

By: /s/ Gerard T. Noce

Gerard T. Noce, #27636

gt@heplerbroom.com

Larry E. Hepler, #21753

leh@heplerbroom.com

Beth A. Bauer, #49981

bab@heplerbroom.com

211 N. Broadway, Suite 2700

St. Louis, MO 63102

314/241-6160/Fax: 314/241-6116

**Attorney for Schwarz Pharma, Inc. (n/k/a
UCB, Inc.)**

RELATOR SCHWARZ PHARMA, INC.'S CERTIFICATION

Signature of this filing certifies the foregoing Reply complies with the limitations contained in Rule 84.06(b). This brief contains approximately 2,581 words.

/s/ Gerard T. Noce

Gerard T. Noce, #27636

gtn@heplerbroom.com

Larry E. Hepler, #21753

leh@heplerbroom.com

Beth A. Bauer, #49981

bab@heplerbroom.com

211 N. Broadway, Suite 2700

St. Louis, MO 63102

314/241-6160/Fax: 314/241-6116

Attorneys for Schwarz Pharma, Inc.

RELATOR SCHWARZ PHARMA, INC.'S
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Signature of this filing certifies the foregoing Reply was served this 25th day of November, 2013 as indicated below.

/s/ Gerard T. Noce
Gerard T. Noce, #27636
gtn@heplerbroom.com
Larry E. Hepler, #21753
leh@heplerbroom.com
Beth A. Bauer, #49981
bab@heplerbroom.com
211 N. Broadway, Suite 2700
St. Louis, MO 63102
314/241-6160/Fax: 314/241-6116

Attorneys for Schwarz Pharma, Inc.

THE HONORABLE DAVID L. DOWD (via electronic mail)
Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis
10 N. Tucker Blvd, Div. 2
St. Louis, Missouri 63101
Phone : 314/622-4372
DDowd@courts.mo.gov
RESPONDENT

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF (via the ECM filing system)

Jeffrey J. Lowe, Jacob A. Flint
Carey, Danis & Lowe
8235 Forsythe, Suite 1100
St. Louis, MO 63105
Phone: 314/678-3400
jeff@jefflowepc.com
jflint@jefflowepc.com

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS PLIVA, INC., BARR PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. n/k/a BARR PHARMACEUTICALS LLC, and BARR LABORATORIES, INC., (via the ECM filing system)

Sandra J. Wunderlich
Stinson Morrison Hecker, LLP
7700 Forsythe Blvd., Suite 1100
St. Louis, MO 63105
Phone: 314/863-0800
swunderlich@stinson.com

Matthew V. Brammer
Ulmer & Berne LLP
600 Vine Street, Suite 2800
Cincinnati, OH 45202
Phone: 513/698-5000
mbrammer@ulmer.com

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS TEVA PHARMACEUTICAL USA, INC. (via the ECM filing system)

Andrew D. Ryan, Natalie J. Kussart
Sandberg Phoenix & VonGontard P.C.
600 Washington Ave. – 15th Floor
St. Louis, MO 63101-1313
Phone: 314/231/3332
Aryan@sandbergphoenix.com
nkussart@sandbergphoenix.com

Richard A. Oetheimer, Jonathan I. Price,
Jennifer Kennedy Gellie
Goodwin Procter, LLP
The New York Times Building
620 Eighth Avenue
New York, NY 10018-1405
Phone: 212/813-8800
roetheimer@goodwinprocter.com
jprice@goodwinprocter.com
jgellie@goodwinprocter.com